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Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE HOME IN CEDAR CITY, HAD 
BEEN "COMMINGLED" INTO THE MARITAL ESTATE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
The initial sentence in Appellee's "Statement of the 
Case" has no relevance to the issues briefed and presented to the 
Court for review and misstates the evidence. Defendant therefore 
objects to that claim. Although Plaintiff had signed an affidavit, 
in an attempt to obtain a temporary restraining order, in which she 
claimed that the Defendant had apparently "pinned" her to the wall 
and "knocked" her to the ground in a violent display of anger, when 
she testified about that incident at trial, she said that, in the 
course of an argument about whether she and Defendant should go to 
dinner or not he came toward her, and as she backed up she hit her 
head on a wall and fell down on her tailbone. 1(T. at 234-235). 
Characterizing that incident as "violent... spousal abuse" is 
misleading at best. 
The Appellee's Statement of Facts as it relates to the 
Court's decision regarding distribution of property includes 
statements for which there is no evidentiary support. Appellee 
claims that she had a "prior home... in Agua Dulce, California," 
and it is true that the trial court made that finding (T. at 750-
751). However, prior to the parties' marriage Plaintiff did not 
have a home; she was the beneficiary of two trust deeds secured by 
a home (T. at 341) and only realized the benefit of that asset 
after considerable time and effort were spent during the marriage. 
(T. at 369-370) In addition, Plaintiff did not testify that the 
proceeds from the sale of Defendant's home were commingled. She 
"believed" that the money to purchase the home came from the 
parties' joint account (T. at 71). However, on cross examination 
Plaintiff freely admitted that she did not know where the funds 
came^from to make the down payment on the home in Cedar City (T. at 
345-346) . 
The home in Cedar City, Utah, was purchased with the 
proceeds from the sale of Defendant's premarital home (T. at 518-
519), in which Plaintiff had no interest (T. at 399), and 
Throughout the brief the literal "R" will stand for Record of 
the case and the literal "T" will stand for the transcript of the 
trial. The numbers following the literals will indicate the page 
where the material referenced can be located. 
Defendant's premarital retirement account. (T. at 396, 601-602) 
That* asset cannot be equated with Plaintiff's interest as 
beneficiary of two trust deeds on the home in Aqua Dulce, where the 
value of that asset was preserved and enhanced as a direct result 
of Defendant's efforts during the marriage, (T. at 583-586). Such 
a simplistic view of the assets of this marriage ignores decisions 
of this Court relating to treatment of premarital property and 
inequitably awards to the Plaintiff a windfall by giving her an 
interest in Defendant's premarital asset for no other reason than 
that she lived in and enjoyed the use of that asset during the 
marriage. 
Although the trial court did find that "the assets," 
apparently referring to the proceeds of the sale of Defendant's 
home and sale of the home which was security for the Plaintiff's 
two trust deeds, "were commingled" (T. at 751), there was no 
credible evidence on which the trial court could base that finding. 
The proceeds from the sale of Defendant's home can be directly 
traced into the down payment for purchase of the home in Cedar City 
both with reference to the amount of the down payment (T. at 518) 
and the date the home was purchased. Defendant sold his home on 
June 9th, received the check on June 13th (T. at 518) and purchased 
the home in Cedar City on June 20, 1988. (T. at 39) 
B. ALTHOUGH THE MARITAL ESTATE MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE 
JAGU&R AUTOMOBILE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT DEFENDANT ALSO HAS A PREMARITAL INTEREST IN THAT 
ASSET. 
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Defendant had a separate property interest in the Jaguar 
automobile. Testimony with reference to a 1984 Corvette 
established that it had been purchased by the Defendant and driven 
back and forth by him from Burbank, California to Cedar City, Utah. 
(T. at 559) That automobile had been purchased with $6,000.00 
whicfr the Defendant had saved from the proceeds of his premarital 
retirement account. That asset in which Defendant had a premarital 
interest, was sold and the funds were applied toward purchase of 
the 1988 Jaguar automobile. (T. at 559-560). The trial court had 
no contrary evidence before it with reference to the source of the 
funds with which the 1988 Jaguar automobile was purchased. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
acknowledge a premarital interest in that asset at least with 
reference to use of the proceeds from the sale of the 1984 
Corvette. 
In light of Defendant's claim that the home in Cedar City 
is his premarital property, he also maintains that the debts 
associated with that asset are his personal debts as well. 
Approximately half of the purchase price for the Jaguar automobile 
was acquired with a loan secured by the Defendant's home in Cedar 
City, (T. at 554, 557) and approximately that same amount remains 
outstanding (T. at 560). This is approximately one-half of the 
purchase price of the vehicle (T. at 560). The trial court could 
and should have recognized Defendant's premarital interest in the 
asset by awarding Defendant either his premarital contribution or 
at least a percentage of the sale proceeds based on the 
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relationship of premarital assets used to purchase the automobile 
to the total purchase price. The trial court erred when it did 
neither, ignoring Defendant's separate property interest. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE A 
MARITAL INTEREST IN THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMARITAL PORSCHE AUTOMOBILE. 
While it is true that there was testimony presented at 
trial that Defendant had been reimbursed from the proceeds of the 
sale of the Aqua Dulce home for expenses to renovate Plaintiff's 
Porsche automobile, (T. at 670) those funds, according to the 
findings of the trial court, were not "premarital funds." The 
trial court correctly found that the proceeds of the sale of the 
Aqua Dulce home were marital funds (T. at 750-751). Accordingly, 
the funds used to reimburse the Defendant for improvements to the 
Plaintiff's premarital automobile were paid for with marital funds. 
The marital estate has an interest in that automobile what the 
trial court should have recognized and awarded to Plaintiff with an 
award of other marital assets of equal value to Defendant. 
D. THE LAW OF THE STATE IN WHICH AN ASSET IS, AND THROUGHOUT 
THE ENTIRE MARRIAGE, HAS BEEN LOCATED, GOVERNS DISPOSITION OF THAT 
ASSET EVEN WHEN A COURT IN THIS STATE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE 
SUBJECT MATTER AND PARTIES IN THE DIVORCE. 
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or parties in a 
lawsuit does not require that the law of the forum govern 
resolution of the dispute. In Forsman v. Forsman 779 P.2d 218 
(Utah 1989) a California couple filed a lawsuit in Utah which would 
have been barred under Utah's doctrine of interspousal immunity. 
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However, the Supreme Court determined that California law, which 
does not recognize the doctrine of interspousal immunity for a 
negligent tort, should have been applied although the lawsuit was 
pending in this state. 
Where the law of the situs of an asset is in conflict with 
Utah law, the trial court must determine which state's law to 
apply. 
The 401K Salaried Savings plan is located, as is 
Defendant's employment, solely in the state of California. Section 
6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides, as a 
general guide to choice of law selection, that the following 
factors, insofar as they may be relevant to the analysis, should be 
considered: (a) The needs of the interstate and international 
systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant 
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the 
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies 
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, 
predictability and uniformity of results, and (g) ease in the 
determination of and application of the law to be applied. 
Although the policy of this state that assets be valued 
at the time of the divorce may appear, at first blush, to suggest 
that Utah law be applied to this matter, competing policies mandate 
that California law be followed when coupled with the apparent 
policy of the state of California that acknowledges a separate 
property interest in post separation earnings (See California Civil 
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Code §5118), the certainty, predictability and uniformity of 
results inherent in application of a California law which allows 
each party to keep his or her earnings following separation, and 
the ease in determining and applying the California law to this 
controversy. 
In this case Defendant tried to obtain a trial setting in 
this matter by requesting a Scheduling Conference and Trial Setting 
on August 13, 1992 (R. at 63-64). The trial, set for October 30, 
1992, was subsequently continued, consistent with Plaintiff's 
motion filed on or about August 24th (R. at 96-97). Ultimately 
trial was held in December. Following the parties' separation, 
Defendant paid temporary alimony, Plaintiff diverted marital funds 
to her own use despite a court order prohibiting her from doing so 
(See page 34 of Appellant's Brief), Defendant contributed his post 
separation earnings to increase the value of his 401K Salaried 
Savings plan and Defendant was actively seeking to obtain a final 
resolution of the matter. There is public policy in favor of 
recognizing Defendant's post separation earnings as his separate 
property under those circumstances. 
Utah has no "significant relationship" to the California 
401K Salaried Savings plan. This is especially so where, as here, 
following the parties' separation, the Defendant was denied access 
to his home in the state of Utah and has resided in the state of 
California, earning income and contributing additional funds toward 
his 401K Salaried Savings Plan in that state. 
E." THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ALLOWED THE 
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PLAINTIFF TO RETAIN MARITAL FUNDS WITHDRAWN FROM THE PARTIES' JOINT 
BUSINESS AND THEREBY PROFIT FROM HER VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER, 
ESPECIALLY WHILE DEFENDANT WAS PAYING HER THE ALIMONY THAT HAD BEEN 
ORDERED. 
Regardless of whether Plaintiff was successful in her efforts 
to manage the parties' jointly owned business, the Sportsmen's 
Lounge, her conduct in withdrawing funds from income generated by 
that business violated the law of this case. The Domestic 
Commissioner had ordered that she not withdraw funds from the 
Lounge (R at 42). The rulings of the Domestic Commissioner are 
binding upon the parties until modified by the District Court Judge 
(Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-402(4)). There is no 
justification in the record for the trial court to excuse 
Plaintiff's blatantly contemptuous conduct. She should have been 
ordered to account to the marital estate for her illegal diversion 
of marital funds by repaying those funds to the marital estate. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO IGNORE DAMAGE TO DEFENDANT'S 
FIREARMS WHICH OCCURRED WHILE THE PLAINTIFF HAD THOSE ITEMS IN HER 
CARE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In response to Defendant's argument that the trial court 
abused its discretion by not awarding him compensation for damage 
to his firearms while in the Plaintiff's possession and care, 
Plaintiff argues that "there was no independent evidence that 
damage resulted from the use" by Plaintiff's son. Plaintiff then 
suggests that the Court's decision was reached after it "weighed 
the credibility" of the witnesses. In order to weigh the 
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credibility of witnesses, there ought to at least be contrary 
evidence presented. Here there was none. The guns were used by 
Plaintiff's son. (T. at 268). The guns were damaged while they 
were in Plaintiff's possession (T. at 645). The trial court's 
failure to make any award to the Appellant to compensate him for 
damage to those firearms ignored the evidence and was an abuse of 
the trial court's discretion. 
G. CHILD SUPPORT ACCRUED DURING THE MARRIAGE IS AN ASSET THAT 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Following termination of these parties' marriage, 
Plaintiff, in addition to other assets awarded her, has the right 
to collect approximately $64,250.00 in delinquent child support 
from her exhusband. The trial court totally ignored that asset, 
failing even to address what value it may have. In doing so the 
trial court abused its discretion. In light of the preferred 
status of a child support debt the trial court should have 
determined the value of that asset to the marital estate and should 
have awarded that asset to the Plaintiff. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE PRESEPARATION TRAVEL 
EXPENSE AND ITS FINDING THE DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT FOR HIS RETAINING 
A PORTION OF THE INCOME TAX REFUND UNTIL THE COURT HAD RULED ON THE 
STATUS OF THAT DEBT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
At the time these parties separated there was an 
outstanding credit card debt of $4,882.35 for travel expenses 
associated with the Defendant's commute between California and 
Cedar City, Utah. That debt had been historically paid as a debt 
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of the marital business. (T. at 592-593) The Defendant had been 
ordered to use the income tax refund to pay business debts. He 
paid certain of those debts. However, he retained the balance of 
the income tax refund and did not pay any specific business debt 
because there was a dispute pending regarding the status of the 
credit card debt (T. at 594). Until the trial court had resolved 
that dispute and acknowledged that obligation as a business debt 
Defendant did not know what he was required to do. In order to be 
held in contempt a party must know what the court has ordered him 
to do, have the ability to comply, and then fail to comply. UCA 
§78-32-1, Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). In this 
case, although Defendant asked for a ruling on that issue (T. at 
719) the trial court did not address the debt in its initial 
findings, and only entered findings and an order relating to that 
credit card debt after Defendant had filed a Motion to Supplement 
Findings and Order. (R. at 283-187, 406-411) The Defendant 
understood that he was to use the funds to pay debts of the 
business, without any debt having been specifically specified. His 
waiting until an issue with regard to the status of a specific debt 
had been resolved is not contemptuous. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings and legal conclusions regarding 
those issues presented in Appellant's brief are not supported by 
the law or the facts. The trial court's ruling should be reversed 
and the relief reguested in Appellant's Brief on Appeal granted. 
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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction is vested with the Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in Cross-Appellant's Brief are 
as foliows: 
1. Is the trial court required to award alimony if the party-
requesting the same is capable of providing for his or her own 
needs and will receive substantial assets pursuant to the trial 
court's division of marital property, just because his or her ex-
spouse earns substantially more income than she or he does, where 
the parties' respective abilities to generate earned income has 
essentially remained the same during the parties' seven year 
marriage. As to the Court's factual finding concerning the 
Plaintiff's needs and ability to support herself, the "clearly 
erroneous" standard should apply. Hagan v. Haqan, 810 P. 2d 478, 
481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). As to the court' decision to award no 
alimony based on those factual findings, the "clear abuse of 
discretion" standard of review should apply. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 
P,2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
2. Is the trial court required to award attorney's fees in a 
divorce proceeding just because there is a disparity in the 
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parties' respective abilities to earn income despite the fact that 
the party requesting attorney's fees has been awarded substantial 
assets from which those attorney's fees could be paid. As to the 
Court's factual finding concerning the Plaintiff's financial need, 
the "clearly erroneous" standard should apply. Haqan v. Hagan, 810 
P.2d 478, 481 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). As to the court' decision to 
award no attorney's fees based on those factual findings, the 
"clear abuse of discretion" standard of review should apply. Kerr 
v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Cross-Appellee incorporates herein by reference the statement 
of the case as set forth in Appellant's Brief, on file herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cross-Appellee incorporates herein by reference the statement 
of facts as set forth in Appellant's Brief, on file herein, 
together with the following: 
1. At trial, Plaintiff testified that her net monthly 
living expenses, excluding housing, and including the living 
expenses for her minor son, totalled $675.00 per month (T. at 202). 
The trial court found that Plaintiff needs $605.00 per month to 
satisfy her financial needs plus housing costs (R. at 360) as 
claimed in her Financial Declaration (T. at 759). 
2. Plaintiff will be responsible to pay the 
approximately $450.00 per month mortgage on the home she is 
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occupying until it sells. (R. at 360) 
3. Plaintiff has earned income, until the Sportsmen's 
Lounge sells, of $1,150.00 per month (R. at 361, T. at 760) which 
is what she had been earning at the time of trial (T. at 192, 362) 
from the Lounge and her part time work at Wendys. 
4. Prior to her marriage to Defendant, Plaintiff was 
employed, earning $6.00 per hour. (T. at 205) 
5. Defendant obtained his current employment prior to 
the marriage to Plaintiff. (T. at 482) 
6. After the Sportsmen's Lounge is sold, Plaintiff will 
be capable of earning $800-$900 per month gross income (R. at 361) 
and will receive substantial cash upon sale of the assets the Court 
ordered sold (R. at 361), of approximately $95,000.00, if she 
receives half the equity realized upon sale of the home in Cedar 
City (R. at 361), plus other assets, including almost half of 
Defendant's 401K Salaried Savings plan. (R. at 371) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In determining whether an award of alimony is appropriate, the 
trial court is required to consider three factors. The trial court 
did so in this case and correctly determined that, regardless of 
whether the Defendant had the ability to pay some support, 
Plaintiff had no need for alimony from the Defendant. Her ability 
to produce income, both prior to and following sale of the marital 
business, a sale which would net payment of a substantial sum to 
Plaintiff, is sufficient to meet her needs. Especially in a 
marriage of relatively short duration—seven years—where neither 
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parties' earning ability has substantially changed, the trial 
court's decision was correct. To rule otherwise would, in essence, 
grant a windfall to one who, in middle age, enters into a second 
marriage with someone who, at the time of that second marriage, 
already had a substantially greater earning ability. Where, as 
here, the Plaintiff still has the ability to support herself at the 
termination of this second marriage, of relatively short duration, 
it is not at all inappropriate for the court to place the parties 
in essentially the same position to support him or herself as each 
was in at the time the marriage began. 
In determining whether an award of attorney's fees is 
appropriate, the court is not required to focus its attention 
exclusively on the earning ability of the parties. In this case, 
the trial court correctly determined that, in light of all of the 
circumstances, including the property awarded to each party, the 
Plaintiff did not need financial assistance from the Defendant to 
pay her attorney's fees. It was not necessary for the trial court 
to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees for which 
assistance in payment was not necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD NO 
NEED FOR ALIMONY AND THEREFORE APPROPRIATELY DECLINED PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUEST FOR AN AWARD OF THE SAME. 
Throughout her brief on this issue, Plaintiff cites several 
cases in support of what she identifies as the "Jones test". The 
trial court is required to consider the following three factors in 
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awarding alimony: "(1) The financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce sufficient income for himself or herself; and (3) the 
ability of the responding spouse to provide support." Watson v. 
Watson/ 837 P.2d 1,3 (Ut. App. 1992), Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1075 (Ut. 1985). Despite acknowledging those three factors, 
Plaintiff focuses her entire argument on the third factor and 
appears to suggest that, regardless of the needs of the requesting 
spouse or her ability to produce sufficient income for herself, the 
Court should award alimony if there is a disparity in the parties' 
earning abilities. That argument is clearly contrary to the law of 
this state as it relates to the issue of alimony. 
In this case the trial court properly determined, based 
on the evidence presented, that the Plaintiff has a monthly 
financial need of approximately $1,055.00 (T. at 759). At the 
present time, with the earnings Plaintiff generates from the 
parties' joint business, she is earning approximately $1,150.00. 
That exceeds her monthly need. (T. at 760). 
When the Sportsmen's Lounge, the parties' joint business, 
is sold the Plaintiff will receive substantial assets. She will 
receive at least one half of the equity in the Sportsmen's Lounge 
(R at 368-369) and may receive more in the event the Defendant 
elects to trade his equity in the Sportsmen's Lounge for 
Plaintiff's claim to his retirement benefit. (R. at 371). In 
addition to the substantial funds Plaintiff will have upon sale of 
the Sportsmen's Lounge, she will still have the ability to produce 
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income of $800-$900 per month even if she is not able to take 
advantage of skills she acquired while managing the Sportsmen's 
Lounge. That amount will at least meet her needs in light of one 
additional factor: Her "needs" as testified to at trial include 
some living expenses for her then minor son. He has now reached 
the age of majority, thereby relieving Plaintiff of the legal 
responsibility for his support. 
In this case, the trial court adopted as its finding the 
Plaintiff's statement concerning her financial needs as set forth 
in her financial declaration (T. at 759). The trial court properly 
found that Plaintiff was capable of meeting those needs with her 
own resources and through her own employment efforts. (T at 759-
762): Therefore, the cases cited by Plaintiff in which the 
requesting spouse's needs exceeded her income, including Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991) and Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 
489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), have no application to this case, except 
insofar as they reaffirm the rule that all three factors must be 
considered by the trial court before awarding alimony. 
The trial court's findings on the issue of alimony are 
adequately supported by the record. 
Plaintiff points out that women generally earn less than 
men do and that men experience an improvement in their post divorce 
standard of living while women experience a decline. (Cross 
Appellant's Brief at 39-40) However, Plaintiff fails to cite any 
studies to suggest to what extent those statistics may be affected 
by short term marriages which do not affect the wife's 
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employability, or in which the wife has not invested "her resources 
jointly in the husband's 'human capital'." 
In this case, the Plaintiff clearly experienced a 
substantial increase in her standard of living when she married the 
Defendant. At that time she was earning $6.00 per hour (T. at 205) 
and the Defendant was employed as an engineer at Lockheed. (T. at 
482) To suggest that the Plaintiff's standard of- living, for 
purposes of an alimony award, should be measured exclusively by her 
spouse's income, especially where he has maintained the same job 
throughout the parties' marriage and the marriage was of relatively 
short duration, suggests an approach to spousal support which, in 
essence, would encourage a person who has married into favorable 
circumstances to enter into and then terminate that marriage in 
crder to enjoy the benefit of the other spouses already established 
earning ability. Marriage is not an institution and divorce is not 
a procedure by which one party is entitled to a windfall. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT, TAKING INTO 
CONSIDERATION THE ASSETS AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, SHE HAS THE ABILITY 
TO PAY HER OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
As this Court pointed out in Muir v. Muir/ 831 P.2d 736 
(Utah App. 1992) the initial inquiry in determining whether 
attorney's fees should be awarded is whether the party seeking 
reimbursement for attorney's fees has the financial need for 
assistance in paying his or her fees and whether the other party 
has the ability to pay those fees. If the Court finds need and the 
ability to pay then the Court should move to the next level of 
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inquiry, that is, whether the fees requested are reasonable. In 
this case the trial court properly found that, in light of other 
assets awarded to the Plaintiff, she had the ability to pay her own 
attorney's fees. Plaintiff has failed to marshall the evidence in 
support of the Court's ruling in that regard to demonstrate that 
the evidence does not support the trial court's finding and appears 
to base her entire argument in this regard on the disparity in the 
parties' earning ability. The trial court is not required to focus 
its attention exclusively on the parties' earning abilities. In 
this, case, the trial court properly considered all factors, 
including property awarded to the Plaintiff, and appropriately 
declined to award attorney's fees in light of the Plaintiff's 
ability to pay her own fees from assets awarded her. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision with regard to the issue of alimony 
and attorney's fees is properly supported by the evidence. 
Plaintiff's argument that the trial court should have focused its 
iaquiry on the disparity in the parties' earning abilities has no 
support in the law of this jurisdiction or in the record. The 
trial court's denial of Plaintiff's request for alimony and 
attorney's fees should he affirmed. x?^ 
DATED this l^l day of (jS^Y , 1993. 
GALLIAN, WES/FALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT 
G. Michael Westfall 
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